Marriage ≠ Marriage: Querying the Relevance of Equality to the Interstate Recognition of Same-Sex Relationships by Redding, Jeffrey A.
University of Miami Law Review 
Volume 69 
Number 1 Volume 69 Number 1 (Fall 2014) Article 5 
10-1-2014 
Marriage ≠ Marriage: Querying the Relevance of Equality to the 
Interstate Recognition of Same-Sex Relationships 
Jeffrey A. Redding 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr 
Recommended Citation 
Jeffrey A. Redding, Marriage ≠ Marriage: Querying the Relevance of Equality to the Interstate Recognition 
of Same-Sex Relationships, 69 U. Miami L. Rev. 117 (2014) 
Available at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr/vol69/iss1/5 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Miami School of Law 
Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Law Review by an authorized 
editor of University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact 
library@law.miami.edu. 
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MIA\69-1\MIA105.txt unknown Seq: 1  4-DEC-14 10:48
Marriage ≠ Marriage: Querying the Relevance
of Equality to the Interstate Recognition of
Same-Sex Relationships
JEFFREY A. REDDING*
This essay seeks to explore and complicate the contemporary U.S.
interstate same-sex relationship-recognition debate and, in particu-
lar, to offer a reconsideration of the relevance of popular notions of
equality to this debate. Indeed, to the extent that equality is meant to
treat identical things identically, it is not a value that is easily appli-
cable to the radical plurality of American family law—a plurality
that complicates even the translation of any state’s ‘marriage’ as
‘marriage’ outside of that state.  Ultimately then, this essay’s explo-
rations lead to an uncomfortable possibility—for liberals and con-
servatives alike—namely that same-sex marriages and civil unions
cannot simplistically be inter-jurisdictionally translated in the United
States as ‘marriage’ always, but neither can opposite-sex ‘marriage’
itself. Indeed, insisting on the identity, or equality, of marriage from
U.S. state to U.S. state occludes the inter-jurisdictional differences
that are always present—if often ignored—in translating (for exam-
ple) a ‘Massachusetts marriage’ as a ‘Mississippi marriage,’ or vice-
versa.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The interstate recognition of relationships has posed numerous
foundational questions for time immemorial. For example, both in
United States and transnational practice, the portability of marriage and
other interpersonal relationships, as well as the portability of these rela-
tionships’ terminations through devices like divorce, has raised funda-
mental questions about the nature of ‘family’ and how this concept gets
translated across jurisdictional borders. Indeed, over the years, officially
monogamous European nations have had to decide the extent to which
they will recognize the polygamous marriages of persons emigrating
from places like North Africa or South Asia. And, in the United States,
one of the more vexing issues in family law—and still unresolved after
the recent Supreme Court decisions in United States v. Windsor1 and
Hollingsworth v. Perry2—has been whether an officially heterosexual
U.S. state should (or must) recognize a same-sex marriage or civil union
entered into within the boundaries of another U.S. state. Whether Euro-
pean or American, inter-jurisdictional relationship-recognition has posed
deep and important questions as to the comparability and compatibility
of different jurisdictions’ family law practices.
This essay seeks to explore and complicate the contemporary U.S.
interstate same-sex relationship-recognition debate, but from an untradi-
tional perspective—one which might be labeled not only untraditional,
but also ‘queer.’ As with all explorations, and especially queer ones, this
essay’s destination is far from certain and not necessarily a conclusive
one. That being said, one primary goal of this essay is to urge a recon-
sideration of the relevance of popular notions of equality to the interstate
relationship-recognition debate in the United States. Indeed, as this
essay will suggest, to the extent that equality intends to treat identical
things identically,3 it is not a value that is easily applicable to the radical
plurality of American family law—a plurality that complicates even the
translation of any state’s ‘marriage’ as ‘marriage’ outside of that state.
Quite simply, then, this essay seeks to explore what interstate relation-
1. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (holding that Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”)
was unconstitutional but not addressing Section 2 of the Act regarding the interstate recognition of
same-sex marriages). Section 3 of DOMA legislated a U.S. federal definition of marriage, which
conflicted with several U.S. states’ definitions of marriage. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No.
104-199, § 3, 110 Stat. 2419, 2419 (1996) (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012)).
2. 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (holding that proponents of Proposition 8, an amendment to
California’s Constitution that defined marriage as only between a man and woman, did not have
standing to appeal the district court’s finding of unconstitutionality, thus not considering the issue
of recognition of out-of-state same-sex marriages).
3. See WENDY BROWN, REGULATING AVERSION: TOLERANCE IN THE AGE OF IDENTITY AND
EMPIRE (2006). Brown notes that “[l]iberal equality is premised upon sameness; it consists in our
being regarded as the same or seen in terms of our sameness by the state.” Id. at 36.
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ship-recognition might look like if the inter-jurisdictional equation
looked less like ‘marriage = marriage’ and more like ‘marriage ≠
marriage.’
A great deal of (liberal) academic writing and political and legal
work on interstate same-sex relationship-recognition has attempted to
use the idea of equality to argue for the universal recognition of a
legally-conducted same-sex marriage, regardless of whether or not a
‘receiving state’ conducts same-sex marriages itself. For example, under
this view, equality dictates that Missouri recognize the same-sex mar-
riage of a couple who marries in the bordering state of Iowa, a state that
conducts same-sex marriages, regardless of Missouri’s extant legal pro-
hibition on conducting same-sex marriages in Missouri itself. As this
‘marriage equality’ thinking often tautologically goes, ‘marriage is mar-
riage’ and, hence, a same-sex marriage conducted in one jurisdiction
should be recognized equally as a marriage in all other jurisdictions.4
This essay, however, aims to queerly complicate this easy conclu-
sion concerning ‘migrating same-sex unions’5 by querying whether all
states’ marriages are, in fact, the same institution—even putting aside
the question of differences between states on same-sex marriage specifi-
cally. Moreover, in problematizing the view that all U.S. states are
essentially trying to do the same thing via the marriages these states
4. See, e.g., Bourke v. Beshear, 996 F. Supp. 2d 542, 544 (W.D. Ky. 2014) (holding that
“Kentucky’s denial of recognition for valid same-sex marriages violates the United States
Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection under the law”); Respect for Marriage Act, HUM.
RTS. CAMPAIGN, http://www.hrc.org/laws-and-legislation/federal-legislation/respect-for-marriage-
act (last updated Mar. 24, 2014) (noting how “[p]rior to a June 2013 ruling by the U.S. Supreme
Court, the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) singled out lawfully married same-sex couples for
unequal treatment under federal law. This law discriminated in two important ways . . . [including]
allow[ing] states to refuse to recognize valid civil marriages of same-sex couples [entered into in
other states]”); Steve Sanders, A New Front for Marriage Equality: Recognizing Same-Sex
Marriages from Other States, AM. CONST. SOC’Y BLOG (July 31, 2013), http://www.acslaw.org/
acsblog/a-new-front-for-marriage-equality-recognizing-same-sex-marriages-from-other-states
(noting how a federal judge in Ohio very recently characterized “an amendment to [the Ohio] state
constitution in 2004 . . . [as] mak[ing] a glaring exception to [Ohio’s general interstate
recognition] rule: it will not recognize same-sex marriages lawfully obtained in other states” and,
moreover, opining how “[t]his discrimination . . . violates the [U.S. Constitution’s Fourteenth
Amendment] Equal Protection Clause”). While Elizabeth Glazer’s work certainly cannot be
placed in the marriage equality camp, it is worth noting that a recent article of hers highlights how
the debate over interstate same-sex relationship-recognition often implicates equality concerns.
See Elizabeth M. Glazer, Civil Union Equality, 2012 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 125, 133–34.
5. See generally Brenda Cossman, Betwixt and Between Recognition: Migrating Same-Sex
Marriages and the Turn Toward the Private, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 153, 156 n.10 (2008),
for a discussion of the term ‘migrating’ to explain the numerous kinds of traveling relationships in
which I am interested here. Like Cossman, I am interested in “the full range of traveling marriages
and civil unions, that is, marriages and unions that are entered into in one jurisdiction, and for a
variety of reasons, then travel to another jurisdiction where some legal recognition [by the state] is
sought.” Id.
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individually conduct, this essay also aims to problematize any simplistic
grafting of equality onto the contemporary interstate relationship-recog-
nition debate concerning same-sex relationships specifically.
Any suggestion that even an opposite-sex marriage cannot easily
be translated as ‘marriage’ outside of this marriage’s home state will be
a difficult one for many readers of this essay to digest. Indeed, as Part II
of this essay’s brief summarization of both historical and contemporary
U.S. approaches to the interstate recognition of formal interpersonal
relationships (as well as their official terminations) suggests, any highly
pluralistic approach to U.S. family law has tended to pose uncomfortable
and distressing possibilities for many U.S. judges, lawyers, and legal
academics alike.6
As a result of this American discomfort with pluralism, another
lens on interstate relationship-recognition is needed (at least for this
essay’s purposes). Part III of this essay, then, builds upon the author’s
background as a comparativist, using experience from the United King-
dom (“U.K.”) and the dilemmas it has faced about whether to recognize
overseas divorces, to demonstrate how one influential legal context has
viewed the highlighting of inter-jurisdictional family law pluralism to be
not only plausible but also desirable.
Part IV returns the focus back to the contemporary United States,
exploring what the implications of adopting a U.K.-like, pluralism-
embracing approach might be for the contemporary interstate relation-
ship-recognition debate in the United States. Indeed, as this concluding
Part’s pluralism-oriented discussion of different U.S. states’ marriage
definitions will suggest, if one does not shy away from how ‘marriage’
is legislatively defined differently in different U.S. states, one finds that
‘marriage’ is never simply—or equal to—‘marriage’ anywhere in the
United States. As a result, it is far from clear that sameness-oriented
equality plays necessary, relevant, or desirable roles—at least in the
ways it is often claimed to play such roles—in the contemporary U.S.
interstate relationship-recognition debate.
Ultimately, this essay’s queer explorations will lead to an uncom-
fortable possibility—for liberals and conservatives alike—namely that
same-sex marriages and civil unions (or domestic partnerships) cannot
simplistically be inter-jurisdictionally translated in the United States as
‘marriage’ always, but neither can opposite-sex ‘marriage’ itself. Indeed,
insisting on the identity, or equality, of marriage from U.S. state to U.S.
6. But see generally Jeffrey A. Redding, Slicing the American Pie: Federalism and Personal
Law, 40 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 941, 972–1014 (2008) (demonstrating the highly pluralistic
nature of family law in the United States and the ways in which this pluralism corresponds to
everyday family law pluralism in other nations’ legal systems).
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state occludes the inter-jurisdictional differences that are always pres-
ent—if often ignored—in translating, for example, a ‘Massachusetts
marriage’ as a ‘Mississippi marriage,’ or vice-versa.
II. INTERSTATE RECOGNITION OF RELATIONSHIPS IN THE UNITED
STATES AND THE ‘PLURALISM PROBLEM’
The recent U.S. debate concerning interstate recognition of same-
sex relationships has transpired on a number of different fronts, many of
them counter-intuitive in their deep relationship to both divorce and
opposite-sex marriage. For example, a relatively contentious kind of
legal case implicating interstate recognition of same-sex marriage has
not concerned marriage per se but, rather, post-marriage, or divorce. In
this kind of case, one party to a same-sex marriage entered into in State
A moves to State B and attempts to initiate a divorce case against the
other marital party in State B. The legal controversy arises when State B
refuses to recognize any same-sex marriage as ‘marriage’ in the first
instance. As a result, State B’s courts have to confront whether they
have the power to hear post-‘marital,’ divorce actions. In these situa-
tions, the legal question for State B goes something like this: Where
there can be no (same-sex) marriage, can there be (same-sex) divorce?7
In the contemporary United States, different states and different
courts have answered this question differently, with there being little
evidence of a national consensus or standard.8 Moreover, for courts that
7. For scholarship on this issue, see generally Elisabeth Oppenheimer, No Exit: The Problem
of Same-Sex Divorce, 90 N.C. L. REV. 73 (2011); Colleen McNichols Ramais, ’Til Death Do You
Part . . . and This Time We Mean It: Denial of Access to Divorce for Same-Sex Couples, 2010 U.
ILL. L. REV. 1013 (2010).
8. For example, in Kern v. Taney, a 2010 Pennsylvania divorce case concerning a same-sex
marriage between two women entered into in Massachusetts, the trial court concluded that “this
court, based on the law in Pennsylvania as it currently exists, cannot grant a divorce to these
parties. Their marriage, perhaps considered valid in Massachusetts and some other states, is not
recognized in Pennsylvania. Without a legally recognizable marriage, relief under the Divorce
Code is simply not available.” Kern v. Taney, 11 Pa. D. & C. 5th 558, 563 (Ct. Com. Pl. 2010).
But, in Dickerson v. Thompson, a 2010 decision from the State of New York Supreme Court,
Appellate Division, a N.Y. appellate court determined that the trial court erred in concluding that
it had no power to dissolve the same-sex couple’s civil union obtained earlier in Vermont. See
Dickerson v. Thompson, 897 N.Y.S.2d 298, 301–02 (2010). For an even more recent case, see
Stankevich v. Milliron, regarding a same-sex divorce and child custody dispute between a
Michigan same-sex couple who had earlier gotten married in Canada. See generally Stankevich v.
Milliron, No. 310710, 2013 WL 5663227 (Mich. Ct. App. Oct. 17, 2013). In this case, decided by
a State of Michigan appellate court, the court refused to recognize that the plaintiff had standing as
a ‘parent’ vis-à-vis the child custody issue because “to recognize plaintiff’s same-sex union as a
marriage under the equitable parent doctrine would directly violate the [Michigan] constitutional
provision that, ‘the union of one man and one woman in marriage shall be the only agreement
recognized as a marriage or similar union for any purpose.’” Id. at *3 (emphasis in original).
While the court in Stankevich did not decide whether a Michigan trial court had the power to
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have both granted and denied interstate recognition of same-sex relation-
ships outside of their home states, these kinds of cases appear to be
fraught ones, causing much distress. This distress seems to result from
the ostensibly unbearable uncertainties about a family’s legal status that
a lack of national consensus on interstate same-sex relationship-recogni-
tion allegedly gives rise to.
For example, U.S. Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy, writ-
ing recently about a somewhat different debate concerning same-sex
marriage, but nonetheless expressing his misgiving about ‘too much
unpredictability’ in family status, fretted that “creating two contradictory
marriage regimes within the same State . . . forces same-sex couples to
live as married [in one context] but unmarried [in another context], thus
diminishing the stability and predictability of basic personal relations.”9
And, recently, a Texas appellate court tried to characterize its refusal to
issue a Texas divorce for a Texas-based same-sex couple that had earlier
married in Massachusetts as almost an act of benevolence—because this
refusal opened up another legal solution that would supposedly be more
widely recognized across the country.10 As this court saw it, or at least
tried to claim, a Texas divorce would have less interstate purchase than a
simple voiding of the marriage would. The court wrote:
We reject appellee’s contention that a declaration of voidness in his
case would not be effective in other jurisdictions as well. We also
note . . . that in this case a decree of divorce would actually create
greater uncertainty than a declaration of voidness, in light of existing
Texas authority that [suggests] a divorce decree would be void and
subject to collateral attack.11
This distress about the uncertainty of persons’ familial status is
somewhat understandable, given that it has been quite some time since
U.S. courts have had to confront what might be considered ‘radical’
family law pluralism in the United States. For example, it has been sev-
enty years since the U.S. Supreme Court intervened to resolve bigamy
prosecutions arising from states’ then wildly different divorce practices
and the refusal of some states to recognize other states’ divorces.12 As a
adjudicate the plaintiff-spouse’s simultaneous divorce claim, it is likely that the court would have
resolved that issue against the plaintiff-spouse as well.
9. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2694 (2013) (emphasis added).
10. See generally In re Marriage of J.B., 326 S.W.3d 654 (Tex. App. 2010).
11. Id. at 679 (emphasis added).
12. Before the Supreme Court’s intervention in the 1940s, a marital spouse who traveled
outside of his divorce-hostile state and obtained a divorce in a divorce-friendly state (e.g., Nevada)
could find himself still married in his home state. A situation like this prompted the Supreme
Court to intervene in the 1940s. The Supreme Court intervened when a ‘Nevada divorced’
husband returned to his home state of North Carolina, remarried there, and promptly faced bigamy
charges by North Carolina authorities. See generally Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287
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result of this Supreme Court intervention, states began to converge in
their divorce practices (by broadly liberalizing the availability of no-
fault divorce), even while maintaining differences with respect to other
important family law issues—for example, interracial marriage. Yet
even the issue of interracial marriage—on which there was deep national
disagreement and differing state practices—was resolved in a pan-
national way nearly fifty years ago by Loving v. Virginia.13 The possibil-
ity and the reality of radical family law pluralism in the United States,14
then, seems to be the stuff of history books. At the very least, it is not a
phenomenon that many contemporary U.S. legal actors seem to be com-
fortable with.
Pluralism between the states with respect to the definition and
understanding of ‘family’ and ‘relationships’ did not simply disappear in
the late-twentieth century United States, however. At the very least, the
idea and possibility of legal pluralism maintained its potency, as recent
legal developments certainly confirm. In this respect, the creation of
same-sex marriage, civil unions, domestic partnerships, and other formal
relationships in some states—but not others—has highlighted the fact
that interstate disagreement about relationship and family norms has per-
sisted even with the pan-U.S. facilitation of divorce and interracial
marriage.
The robustly pluralistic bent of U.S. family law is also evident in a
surviving section of the U.S. federal government’s 1996 Defense of
Marriage Act,15 concerning interstate recognition of marriage. In this
section, Congress—ostensibly acting on its powers to define the reach of
the U.S. Constitution’s ‘full faith and credit’ provisions16—explicitly
(1942). In Williams, the Court invalidated these bigamy charges, holding that as long as a
divorcing state’s domicile and divorce practices were properly complied with, other states would
have to recognize that divorce even if they would themselves not have divorced the marital couple
in question. See id. at 303. See also Frederic M. Bloom, State Courts Unbound, 93 CORNELL L.
REV. 501, 519–25 (2008) (discussing how the legal situation was actually a bit more complicated,
as seen in the follow-up case of Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945)).
13. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
14. While it is often underplayed, there still remain significant differences between the states
on issues pertaining to minimum age of marriage, conceptions of marital property, and the
significance (or legality) of cohabitation. See generally Joanna L. Grossman, Resurrecting
Comity: Revisiting the Problem of Non-Uniform Marriage Laws, 84 OR. L. REV. 433, 437–45
(2005).
15. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 2, 110 Stat. 2419, 2419 (1996) (codified
at 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2012)). United States v. Windsor ruled that Section 3 of DOMA, with
regards to the federal definition of “marriage,” was unconstitutional. See 133 S. Ct. 2675,
2695–96 (2013).
16. See generally U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (declaring that “Full Faith and Credit shall be
given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And
the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records, and
Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.”). DOMA ostensibly picked up on the
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confirmed states’ powers to refuse recognition to same-sex marriages
entered into outside of their borders. The federal affirmation of such a
state power to refuse inter-jurisdictional recognition of same-sex mar-
riages both countervailed, and also aligned with, historical practice con-
cerning interstate recognition of marriages. The general practice of U.S.
states has been to recognize marriages entered into in any other U.S.
state as long as local laws and rules in that other state, the ‘place of
celebration,’ were complied with.17 Yet there has always been a ‘public
policy’ exception to this general ‘place of celebration’ recognition rule,
even if the reach of that exception has varied in the minds of states and
scholars.18
While family law pluralism has thus persisted at many levels and in
many different ways in the United States, the recent judicial, political,
and scholarly discussion of interstate recognition of same-sex relation-
ships has largely revolved around trying to minimize or ignore this plu-
ralism. In these discussions, one might say that the focus has been on
‘the United States,’ rather than ‘the United States.’ Moreover, in these
discussions, the question presumed and presented—whether by support-
ers or opponents of the interstate recognition of same-sex relation-
ships—is one concerning whether a generic ‘marriage’ entered into in
one U.S. jurisdiction should be recognized as a generic ‘marriage’ in
another U.S. jurisdiction (whether for purposes of marriage itself or
post-marriage/divorce).19 Indeed, the ‘marriage’-register of this discus-
Constitution’s delegation to Congress to determine the reach and scope of Article IV, Section 1,
but then declared that Congress would not compel any state to extend ‘full faith and credit’ to any
other state’s same-sex marriage, thereby essentially giving no effect to Article IV, Section 1 with
respect to same-sex marriages. The specific text of the relevant section of DOMA is as follows:
No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian tribe, shall be
required to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of any other
State, territory, possession, or tribe respecting a relationship between persons of the
same sex that is treated as a marriage under the laws of such other State, territory,
possession, or tribe, or a right or claim arising from such relationship.
Defense of Marriage Act § 2.
17. This ‘place of celebration’ rule is embodied in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of
Laws. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283(2) (1971).
18. See generally William Baude, Beyond DOMA: Choice of State Law in Federal Statutes,
64 STAN. L. REV. 1371, 1387–90 (2012) (discussing states’ and scholars’ different understandings
and practices with respect to recognizing a marriage entered into in a ‘foreign’ state’s
jurisdiction); see also Barbara J. Cox, Same-Sex Marriage and the Public Policy Exception in
Choice-of-Law: Does It Really Exist, 16 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 61, 66–67 (1996) (concluding that, at
the time, the public policy exception was not widely deployed by most U.S. state courts).
19. See, e.g., Baude, supra note 18, at 1419–20 (referring to marriage as a “transsubstantive R
status”); Grossman, supra note 14, at 487–88 (arguing against “[c]ategorical non-recognition of R
same-sex marriage def[ying] both the modern approach to conflict of laws and the historical
approach to marriage recognition,” and arguing that “[h]istory in this context . . . shows the value
states once placed on comity and interstate respect in the marriage context. Tolerance of
disfavored marriages was an important and widespread value, which was honored by a strong
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sion is mostly inescapable, even for some of the most interesting inter-
ventions into this discussion.20 As a result, migrating ‘civil unions’ or
‘domestic partnerships’ get inter-jurisdictionally translated as ‘mar-
riages’ in this conflicts debate21—and, just as oddly, ‘Massachusetts
marriages’ get equated with ‘Mississippi marriages’—without evident
inter-jurisdictional conflicts about the nature of formal relationships
sparking any critical discussion about whether these kinds of ‘marriage’
translations are correct.
This is not to say that these kinds of translations are necessarily
implausible or undesirable, but it is to say that more critical attention—
and respect—could be paid to actual legal categories and nomenclatures
rather than assuming that every legal system, whether domestic or for-
eign, operates in the same way, and for the same purposes, with the
same notions of family and marriage.22 In other words, more respect for
family law pluralism could be realized. The next Part of this essay turns
to an example of a jurisdictional context that has felt the need to high-
light pluralism in family law practices, rather than to bury it.
general rule of marriage recognition.”); Andrew Koppelman, Interstate Recognition of Same-Sex
Marriage and Civil Unions: A Handbook for Judges, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 2143, 2143 (2005)
(arguing that “[s]ame-sex marriage is here. . . . Other states have virtually the same status . . . . Are
these statuses exportable? Will same-sex unions be recognized in other states? The answer should
not be mysterious.”); Steve Sanders, The Constitutional Right to (Keep Your) Same-Sex Marriage,
110 MICH. L. REV. 1421, 1432 (2012) (arguing against local variance in defining and recognizing
relationships by claiming that “marriage and family are not understood today as merely ‘state
legislatures’ . . . political creation.’”) (quoting NANCY F. COTT, PUBLIC VOWS: A HISTORY OF
MARRIAGE AND THE NATION 54 (2000)).
20. Hillel Levin’s work provides such an interesting exception. See Hillel Y. Levin, Resolving
Interstate Conflicts over Same-Sex Non-Marriage, 63 FLA. L. REV. 47 (2011). However, despite
Levin’s provocative title invoking ‘non-marriage,’ his analysis of how non-marital relationship
statuses should be trans-jurisdictionally translated and operationalized still interpellates a
‘marriage’-register to this entire issue. See id. at 53. In this respect, Levin writes: “[U]ntil now,
scholars have focused nearly exclusively on conflicts that arise between states that recognize
same-sex marriage and those that offer them no recognition at all, ignoring the marriage/
marriage-like/marriage-lite conflicts . . . . This Article fills this lacuna and offers a new
framework for resolving the marriage/marriage-like/marriage-lite conflicts.” Id. at 47 (emphasis
added).
21. See, e.g., Dickerson v. Thompson, 897 N.Y.S.2d 298, 299 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010).
22. Again, I am intrigued by Hillel Levin’s recent work in this respect, and especially his
invocation of a French conflicts-of-law doctrine concerning legal ‘equivalents’ to resolve some of
the inter-jurisdictional ‘marital conflicts’ that he identifies. See generally Levin, supra note 20, at R
74–89. However, his particular use of this doctrine does raise the question as to whether he is
comparing apples with oranges, especially when he tries to resolve ‘true’ inter-jurisdictional
family law conflicts by resorting to interstate similarities in the contract law dimensions of
different jurisdictions’ relationship-recognition categories. See id. at 78. This does beg the
question, then, as to whether family is family, contract, or something else altogether in different
jurisdictions and whether there are adequate translations which can bridge these epistemological
divides.
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III. PLURALISM IN AN ENGLISH ACCENT
The sovereign U.S. states offer up a particular kind of family law
pluralism. While this family law pluralism is evident, it is arguably the
case that European states have existed in a context of relatively more
heightened sovereignty and consciousness of family law pluralism.23 At
the very least, the softening touch of English lingual homogeneity—and
the accompanying ‘luxury’ of translating ‘marriage’ as ‘marriage’ inter-
jurisdictionally—often does not exist when interstate relationship-recog-
nition is done in Europe. Because of Europe’s especially deep acquain-
tance with family law pluralism, this Part engages in a European case
study—in particular, one from the United Kingdom—as a helpful exem-
plar of how one could surface some of the family law plurality which is
present but nonetheless suppressed in the U.S. interstate relationship-
recognition debate.
The United Kingdom was perhaps the European country histori-
cally most implicated in colonial enterprises around the globe. As a
result of these colonial enterprises, the United Kingdom has faced a
steady stream of legal questions concerning the marital status of people
who have migrated from its former colonies and, despite this migration,
have still chosen to conduct some of their family law matters in their
countries of origin. Such a situation is on full display in the well-known
U.K. case of Chaudhary v. Chaudhary.24 Chaudhary is a relatively old
case, dating from 1985, and also one whose day-to-day relevance has
been overtaken in many ways by more-recent statutory law.25 Nonethe-
23. See generally Aude Fiorini, Rome III—Choice of Law in Divorce: Is the Europeanization
of Family Law Going Too Far?, 2 INT’L J.L. POL’Y & FAM. 178, 179 (2008) (noting that “[t]he
substantive law pertaining to legal separation continues to differ widely between the [European
Union] Member States; from Maltese Law where there is a prohibition of divorce to Finnish or
Swedish Law where no actual grounds of divorce are required. Moreover there is an equally wide
divergence with regard to conflict of law rules on the matter”); Jan-Jaap Kuipers, The Law
Applicable to Divorce as Test Ground for Enhanced Cooperation, 18 EUROPEAN L.J. 201, 201–03
(2012) (describing how “[t]he law on divorce differs widely between the [European Union]
Member States. Malta is the only Member State that does not allow for divorce at all. Finland and
Sweden, on the other hand, have the most liberal divorce law. . . . These Member States do not
require any ground for divorce, but a consideration period of six months may be applicable. Some
Member States allow for divorce by mutual consent, but may require a previous period of factual
separation. The longest period can be found in Ireland (four years). Nine Member States allow for
a divorce based on the fault of one of the spouses”).
24. Chaudhary v. Chaudhary, [1985] Fam. 19 (C.A.) (U.K.). For two academic articles
attesting to Chaudhary’s importance, see Hon. David Pearl, The 1995 Noel Coulson Memorial
Lecture: The Application of Islamic Law in the English Courts, 12 ARAB L.Q. 211 (1997), and see
also Alan Reed, Transnational Non-Judicial Divorces: A Comparative Analysis of Recognition
Under English and U.S. Jurisprudence, 18 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 311 (1996).
25. In particular, the legislative situation has changed as a result of the Family Law Act of
1986. For a discussion of this legislative act, as well as the previous legal situations obtaining in
this area of U.K. law, see Divorce, U.K. BORDER AGENCY, available at https://www.gov.uk/
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less, the underlying facts and judicial discussion in this rich and compli-
cated case still provide an illuminating illustration of how one influential
legal context has viewed the highlighting of inter-jurisdictional family
law pluralism to be not only plausible, but also desirable. Moreover,
more recent statutory interventions in the United Kingdom have gener-
ally tended to confirm the pluralistic orientation of Chaudhary, thereby
still making it a very relevant case—if not the most important one. For
these reasons, this case is the focus of this Part.
In this complicated case concerning the inter-jurisdictional recogni-
tion of (post-)marriage, the main question presented was whether a talaq
effectuated in Pakistani-controlled Kashmir (also known as Azad Kash-
mir) by a U.K.-residing husband served—in the eyes of the United
Kingdom—to terminate the marriage of this husband with his wife (who
was also from Azad Kashmir but who had recently arrived in the United
Kingdom). This is the essential question that both the U.K. trial court
and the Court of Appeal had to decide.26 Both of these courts’ opinions
are relied on here in the course of explicating the complicated facts of
this case. After this explication, this Part concludes with an analysis of
how the Court of Appeal’s resolution of this case engages in an inter-
jurisdictional pluralism-promoting approach to family status—an
approach that many U.S. legal actors would find distinctly troubling.
The husband whose actions were in question in Chaudhary was
Khan Mohammed Chaudhary. Mr. Chaudhary was born in Azad Kash-
mir in 1932. After marrying at an early age, he divorced that wife and
married Bibi Saira Chaudhary.27 In 1963, Mr. Chaudhary was able to
obtain a work permit and entered the United Kingdom for the first
time.28
After coming to the United Kingdom, Mr. Chaudhary infrequently
returned to Azad Kashmir29 but kept his Pakistani nationality and never
obtained U.K. citizenship.30 In fact, Mr. Chaudhary seems to have essen-
tially settled down in the United Kingdom soon after his initial arrival in
1963, so much so that he took a second wife. Mr. Chaudhary married
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/267931/divorce.pdf. See also Reed,
supra note 24, at 333. R
26. Chaudhary, Fam. at 21–22.
27. See id. at 23. Per an examination of the trial court opinion in this case, the precise dates of
this first marriage and first divorce are not ascertainable. Indeed, the trial court judge himself
noted that “[Bibi Saira Chaudhary] is, in fact, [Mr. Chaudhary’s] second wife and shortly after
marrying her, he divorced a wife whom he had married when he was very young. I do not know
the date of the earlier marriage or of the divorce.” Id.
28. See id.
29. See id.
30. The trial court lists Mr. Chaudhary and Bibi Saira Chaudhary as Pakistani nationals. See
id. at 22.
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Hamida Begum (who was known as Sue Chaudhary) in December of
1967 at the Hammersmith Register Office in London.31 While the two
were first married in London in 1967, they married again in a Muslim
ceremony in Beirut, Lebanon in 1969.32 In 1972, upon a return trip to
Pakistan—his first since arriving in the United Kingdom in 196333—Mr.
Chaudhary informed Bibi Saira Chaudhary that he had taken a second
wife.34 According to his testimony to the trial court, paraphrased by the
trial court judge, “his wife [Bibi Saira Chaudhary] was sympathetic and
raised no objection, provided that he maintained both families.”35
Whether there was really no objection was cast into some doubt by
what transpired next. In late 1975, Bibi Saira Chaudhary, as well as her
and Mr. Chaudhary’s four children, arrived in the United Kingdom on a
trip financed by Mr. Chaudhary.36 All five visitors, along with Mr.
Chaudhary and Hamida Begum, “crowded into” a property that Mr.
Chaudhary and Hamida Begum normally shared together as a home.37
Cohabitation lasted less than two weeks, however, and Bibi Saira
Chaudhary returned to Pakistan with three of her children.38
Shortly thereafter, Mr. Chaudhary sought out and received a talaq
from Bibi Saira Chaudhary at a London mosque.39 As the trial court
described this legal event, “[Mr. Chaudhary] went to the mosque . . . and
pronounced an oral talaq three times in Urdu before two witnesses. . . .
As the wife was in Pakistan it was decided that in addition a talaknama
or written document should be made out and a copy sent to her.”40
While Mr. Chaudhary claimed that this talaknama was sent to Bibi Saira
Chaudhary in Azad Kashmir, there is some question as to whether she
actually received it.41 In any event, it appears that ultimately she did
learn of Mr. Chaudhary’s pronouncement of talaq and, as a result,
decided to return to the United Kingdom in July 1977.42
31. See id. at 24.
32. According to the trial court, “on 18 August 1969 the husband went through a second
ceremony of marriage with Hamida in a Muslim court in Beirut. He gave as the reason for this
second ceremony that the certificate of marriage from there would be acceptable world wide.” Id.
While not the focus of this litigation, in this second ceremony in Beirut, again we see people’s
concern with the portability of their relationships and also a concern that ‘marriage’ in a secular
proceeding creates, at least in some instances, less of an internationally-recognized status than
does a religious proceeding.
33. See id. at 23.




38. See id. at 24.
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In February 1978, Bibi Saira Chaudhary filed a claim against Mr.
Chaudhary in a U.K. civil court alleging desertion and failure to main-
tain.43 Three months later, in May 1978, Mr. Chaudhary traveled to
Azad Kashmir, where “he once again pronounced an oral talaq three
times in front of two witnesses”44 and was again issued a talaknama,
which he transmitted to Bibi Saira Chaudhary.45
The ability, or willingness, of the United Kingdom to legally recog-
nize this second talaq was the central question confronted in Chaudhary
by both the trial court46 and the Court of Appeal.47 In particular, both the
trial court and the Court of Appeal had to determine whether a ‘bare
talaq,’ as it was described in the litigation,48 was obtained via a ‘pro-
ceeding,’ such that the Recognition of Divorces and Legal Separations
Act of 1971 (“1971 Act”) could recognize this talaq as a divorce in the
United Kingdom. This 1971 Act permitted U.K. recognition of divorces
and legal separations that were “obtained by means of judicial or other
proceedings in any country outside the British Isles; and . . . [which
were] effective under the law of that country.”49
The trial court held that a bare talaq was not something obtained
via an ‘other proceeding’—i.e., a proceeding other than a judicial pro-
ceeding, which Mr. Chaudhary clearly did not engage in to get the talaq
in question—and thus the 1971 Act was not applicable.50 Upon Mr.
Chaudhary’s appeal to the Court of Appeal, the members of the Court of
Appeal panel that heard Mr. Chaudhary’s case responded differently to
43. See id.
44. Id.
45. See id. at 25.
46. The trial court noted that Mr. Chaudhary’s attorney placed more weight on the efficacy of
the second talaq, though it is not clear from the reported case why that was the case. See id. at 27.
47. See id. at 30.
48. This terminology is used to describe the kind of talaq ‘divorce’ that Mr. Chaudhary
pronounced (twice) in the set of events described in this Part. There are other kinds of talaq
procedures recognized by the many schools of thought that give shape to the classical Islamic
tradition. These other kinds of talaq are as effective as the kind that Mr. Chaudhary utilized (i.e.
three pronouncements in one sitting) but are generally viewed with more religious favor and
sanction, seeing that they give the marital couple more opportunity for reconciliation.
49. Recognition of Divorces and Legal Separations Act, 1971, c. 53, § 2(a)–(b) (U.K.)
(emphasis added). A secondary question was also presented in this litigation in the event that the
1971 Act could recognize a bare talaq as a divorce, namely whether the United Kingdom could
still refuse recognition to this kind of talaq on grounds of public policy. Chaudhary, Fam. at 34.
According to the trial court, public policy was a residual common law consideration in inter-
jurisdictional relationship-recognition cases in the United Kingdom, and was also specifically
legislated by the 1971 Act at Section 8(2) as a principle that could be used to limit the United
Kingdom’s recognition of some kinds of ‘divorces’ otherwise cognizable under the 1971 Act. See
id. at 28–29.
50. Chaudhary, Fam. at 28. The trial court also held that, even if the 1971 Act’s ‘other
proceedings’ requirement had been met, there were public policy grounds for refusing recognition
to this kind of talaq. See id. at 29.
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the question presented. However, all three concurred that the 1971 Act
did not contemplate recognizing Mr. Chaudhary’s ‘bare talaq’ as a
divorce in the United Kingdom because it had not been accomplished
via ‘proceedings.’
Interestingly, in so deciding, all three translated the Urdu/Arabic
word ‘talaq’ as ‘divorce’ in English, but then refused to inter-jurisdic-
tionally translate ‘divorce’ (Azad Kashmir-style) as ‘divorce’ (United
Kingdom-style). For example, Lord Justice Cumming-Bruce’s lead
opinion quoted with approval from an opinion in an earlier Court of
Appeal decision51 to the effect that:
In [my] judgment, the phrase [‘proceedings’] must be intended to
exclude those divorces which depend for their legal efficacy solely on
the act or acts of the parties to the marriage or one of them. In such
cases, although certain formalities or procedures have to be complied
with, there is nothing which can properly be regarded as
‘proceedings.’52
With this understanding of ‘proceedings’ in mind, Cumming-Bruce
eventually held that the 1971 Act53 could not recognize Mr. Chaudhary’s
talaq as a divorce or a legal separation.54
Lord Justice Oliver concurred with the legal result reached by
Cumming-Bruce and also had the following to say about a ‘bare talaq-
cum-divorce’ and why such divorce is actually not divorce, at least for
the purposes of the United Kingdom:
The essentials of the bare talaq are, as I understand it, merely the
private recital of a verbal formula in front of witnesses who may or
may not have been specially assembled by the husband for the pur-
pose and whose only qualification is that, presumably, they can see
and hear. It may be, as it was in this case, pronounced in the temple.
51. See Quazi v. Quazi, [1980] A.C. 744 (C.A.) 788–89 (appeal taken from U.K.).
52. Chaudhary, Fam. at 37 (emphasis added) (quoting Quazi, A.C. at 788–89 ). Later in his
opinion, Cumming-Bruce also opined that the pronouncement of a bare talaq
finally terminates the marriage in Kashmir, Dubai, and probably in other
unsophisticated peasant, desert or jungle communities which respect classical
Muslim religious tradition. Certainly by that tradition the pronouncement is a
solemn religious act. It might doubtfully be described as a ceremony, though the
absence of any formality of any kind renders the ceremony singularly
unceremonious.
Id. at 38 (emphasis added).
53. The legislative situation upon which this judgment sits is actually a bit more complicated,
given that the 1971 Act was amended and expanded upon in 1973 by the Domicile and
Matrimonial Proceedings Act. See generally Domicile and Matrimonial Proceedings Act, 1973, c.
45, §§ 1–17 (U.K.). Nonetheless, all three members of the Court of Appeal panel did not view the
1973 amendments as material to the proper construction of the 1971 Act’s use of the phrase “other
proceedings.” See Chaudhary, Fam. at 39, 43, 47.
54. Cumming-Bruce also refused to overrule the trial court’s denial of recognition of Mr.
Chaudhary’s talaq for reasons of public policy. See Chaudhary, Fam. at 40.
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It may be, as it was here, reinforced by a written document containing
such information, accurate or inaccurate, as the husband cares to
insert in it. But what brings about the divorce is the pronouncement
before witnesses and that alone. Thus in its essential elements it lacks
any formality other than ritual performance; it lacks any necessary
element of publicity; it lacks the invocation of the assistance or
involvement of any organ of, or recognised by, the state in any capac-
ity at all, even if merely that of registering or recording what has been
done. Thus, though the public consequences are very different, the
essential procedure differs very little from any other private act such
as the execution of a will and is akin to the purely consensual type of
divorce recognised in some states of the Far East.55
Finally, Judge Balcombe also wrote to concur that, in his prece-
dent-informed view, not all overseas divorces should count as divorces
in the United Kingdom:
In giving the judgment of the Court of Appeal in [the precedent]
Quazi v. Quazi . . . [Lord Justice] Ormrod . . . pointed out . . . that the
inclusion in . . . the Act of 1971 of the requirement that the overseas
divorce must have been obtained “by means of judicial or other pro-
ceedings” must have been intended as a limitation on the scope of the
section; if those words had been omitted the only relevant question
would be: “Is the divorce effective under the relevant law?” Some
forms of divorce must, therefore, be excluded, and the filter is the
phrase “judicial or other proceedings.”56
Read together, one can characterize the Court of Appeal panel
members’ opinions in Chaudhary as willing to translate the Islamic legal
practice of talaq as ‘divorce,’ but unwilling to translate a talaq/divorce
performed in Azad Kashmir into a divorce enforceable in the United
Kingdom. In other words, after reading these opinions, one is left with
the distinct feeling that ‘divorce’ is very much not a generic practice
across the world. In the United Kingdom, at least, ‘divorce’ connotes a
non-unilateral practice conducted with the knowledge and oversight
(however limited) of another party external to the marriage. For the
Court of Appeal, however, an Azad Kashmir ‘divorce’ is not like a
United Kingdom ‘divorce’—and, in fact, is perhaps more akin to a pri-
vate testamentary will.57
The relevant law in the United Kingdom has changed since the
1985 decision in Chaudhary.58 However, the attention that the Court of
Appeal gave to Mr. Chaudhary’s practices (or lack thereof) in pursuing
55. Id. at 42 (emphasis added).
56. Id. at 45 (quoting Quazi, A.C. at 788).
57. See supra text accompanying note 55.
58. See supra note 25. R
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his (second) talaq provides an intriguing exemplar of how and why a
given jurisdiction might deploy pluralism-embracing analyses of other
jurisdictions’ family law practices. The next Part turns to how the kind
of pluralism-oriented analysis deployed in Chaudhary could play out in
the contemporary U.S. debate over interstate recognition of same-sex
relationships. In this debate, the assumption amongst many is that a
generic ‘marriage’ is the register most appropriate to any interstate
same-sex relationship-recognition analysis, as well as that ‘equality’ is
necessarily deeply imbricated in this ongoing social and legal debate.
IV. MARRIAGE ≠ MARRIAGE
The Chaudhary case is not only a testament to the possibility that
legal statuses may not easily translate across jurisdictional borders—
being ‘divorced’ in one place may not mean being ‘divorced’ in another
place—but, relatedly, that fairly fundamental legal categorizations may
not translate so easily either. With respect to this latter observation, one
particularly intriguing aspect of the set of opinions issued in Chaudhary
is Lord Justice Oliver’s observation that Mr. Chaudhary’s actions in
Azad Kashmir were perhaps more akin to will-making than divorcing—
or, read at another level, more involving an act pertaining to property
law rather than family law.59
Taking inspiration from Chaudhary’s pluralism-embracing
approach to interstate relationship-recognition, this concluding Part
explores how the particulars of U.S. states’ legislative definitions of
‘marriage’ make it difficult to translate ‘marriage’ as ‘marriage’ across
jurisdictional lines—whether that ‘marriage’ is same-sex or opposite-
sex. As in Chaudhary, the different ways states fundamentally catego-
rize relationship status—as belonging to family law or another legal
domain altogether—contribute to this interstate translation conundrum.
To help get an initial grasp on the plurality of U.S. states’ marital
practices, this Part first takes a brief and non-comprehensive ‘road-trip’
across different U.S. states and these states’ different definitions of mar-
riage. This Part then concludes with a discussion of how a deeper focus
on various states’ (post-)marriage definitions and practices can
problematize the ‘marriage equality’ analysis that many academics,
activists, and legal actors are demanding with respect to the interstate
recognition of same-sex relationships.
A. Marriage Road-Tripping
U.S. states not only define marriage differently, but do so in a num-
59. See supra text accompanying note 55.
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ber of different ways. For example, some states have come to define
marriage via their state constitutions, others have left marriage to be
defined by state statutes, and others do both. Some states have chosen
not to legislatively define marriage per se at all, instead just legislating
restrictions on who is eligible for an otherwise undefined ‘marriage.’60
Beyond differences in the particular method by which U.S. states
define marriage, states’ substantive definitions also vary wildly. For
example, an Alabama statute declares that “[m]arriage is inherently a
unique relationship between a man and a woman. . . . Marriage is a
sacred covenant, solemnized between a man and a woman . . . which is
recognized by the state as a civil contract.”61 While Michigan’s defini-
tion of marriage echoes Alabama’s emphasis on the uniqueness of mar-
riage—with Michigan defining marriage as a “unique relationship
between a man and a woman”62—Michigan seemingly has less faith that
the language of contract comports with that uniqueness. Thus, in the
same statutory provision that mentions the uniqueness of opposite-sex
marital relations, Michigan refers to same-sex marriages—which it
refuses to recognize—as relationships merely “contracted between indi-
viduals of the same sex.”63
Traversing the country to Arizona, one finds Alabama-like ‘cove-
nant marriage,’ but not in Arizona’s basic definition of marriage. Indeed,
no Arizona statute directly defines ‘marriage simpliciter’—rather than
defining marriage, the emphasis is on who may not marry.64 However, a
specific Arizona statute does allow people to enter into a special kind of
marriage—known as a ‘covenant marriage’—going on to declare that
this type of marriage “is a covenant between a man and a woman who
agree to live together as husband and wife for as long as they both
live.”65
60. Of course, all states’ legislative definitions of marriage are further developed and given
additional shape and nuance by judicial common law as well.
61. ALA. CODE § 30-1-19(b) to (c) (2014).
62. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 551.1 (2014).
63. Id.
64. See, for example, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-101(A)–(C) (2013), declaring the
following marriages “[v]oid and prohibited”:
A. Marriage between parents and children, including grandparents and
grandchildren of every degree, between brothers and sisters of the one-half as well
as the whole blood, and between uncles and nieces, aunts and nephews and between
first cousins, is prohibited and void.
B. Notwithstanding subsection A, first cousins may marry if both are sixty-five
years of age or older or if one or both first cousins are under sixty-five years of age,
upon approval of any superior court judge in the state if proof has been presented to
the judge that one of the cousins is unable to reproduce.
C. Marriage between persons of the same sex is void and prohibited.
65. Id. § 25-901(B)(1) (2013).
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Traveling even farther west, to California, one finds marriage
defined differently still. Until the recent set of events opening up mar-
riage in California to both same-sex and opposite-sex couples, California
defined marriage as “a personal relation arising out of a civil contract
between a man and a woman”—the restriction on the gender of marital
partners has now been removed but the rest of the definition remains.66
In this definition, there is little trace of the religiosity accompanying
both Alabama’s and Arizona’s covenant-oriented marital definitions,
yet, simultaneously, there is overlap with Alabama’s and Michigan’s
‘relational’ language. Like California, Idaho too has declared marriage
to be a “personal relation arising out of a civil contract” (and has
restricted the contracting parties to “a man and a woman”).67
All the way back on the east coast, Connecticut contributes a note-
worthy definition of marriage to the national landscape. Connecticut
defines marriage without explicitly referencing the marital parties’ gen-
ders but also suggests a fusion of these parties—rather than their dyadic
relationship—when it defines marriage as “the legal union of two per-
sons.”68 Interestingly, Georgia echoes Connecticut’s ‘union language’
but re-genders such a union; according to the Georgia constitution,
“[t]his state shall recognize as marriage only the union of man and
woman.”69 Florida’s definition of marriage also invokes the language of
“union” while, like Georgia, also gendering such a union. In this respect,
a Florida statute declares: “For purposes of interpreting any state statute
or rule, the term ‘marriage’ means only a legal union between one man
and one woman as husband and wife.”70 Louisiana’s definition of mar-
riage is very similar to this Florida definition.71
To conclude this brief road-trip of U.S. states’ different marital def-
initions, Kentucky’s definition of marriage is one of the more unique
and intriguing ones. This definition confirms the civil status of Kentucky
marriages, yet also the union of one man and one woman that sits at
their core:
As used and recognized in the law of the Commonwealth, “marriage”
refers only to the civil status, condition, or relation of one (1) man
66. CAL. FAM. CODE § 300(a) (West 2013). This definition of marriage was determined to be
unconstitutional by In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 402 (Cal. 2008). In that case, the
California Supreme Court determined “that the language of section 300 limiting the designation of
marriage to a union ‘between a man and a woman’ is unconstitutional and must be stricken from
the statute, and that the remaining statutory language must be understood as making the
designation of marriage available both to opposite-sex and same-sex couples.” Id. at 453.
67. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-201(1) (2014).
68. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-20(4) (2013).
69. GA. CONST. art. 1, § 4, ¶ I.
70. FLA. STAT. § 741.212 (2014).
71. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 86 (2014).
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and one (1) woman united in law for life, for the discharge to each
other and the community of the duties legally incumbent upon those
whose association is found on the distinction of sex.72
Here then, arguably, we have marriage not as marriage, but as civil
union.
As should be clear by now, ‘marriage’ is not a simple or univalent
phenomenon in the United States. Yet many scholarly discussions and
judicial decisions in the United States assume, or insist, that marriage
means essentially one thing—whether that ultimately means that a mar-
riage entered into in one state is recognized as a marriage in another
state, or even when it is not.73 Moreover, civil unions, domestic partner-
ships, and other formal relationships are problematized, as if their trans-
lation across state borders is uniquely difficult. Yet, as we have seen in
the context of Kentucky, a marriage might already be a civil union.
Moreover, this Part’s marital road-trip has suggested that even a mar-
riage may not be a marriage, at least outside of the marriage’s home
jurisdiction. The next section explores what the U.S. context of radical
family law pluralism might mean for the current U.S. interstate same-sex
relationship-recognition debate and, in particular, the relevance of equal-
ity to this debate.
B. What Marriage? Why Equality? Marriage Equality How?
Much recent U.S. scholarship and (liberal) activism on the inter-
state same-sex relationship-recognition debate has demonstrated a deep
fondness for what is often called ‘marriage equality.’74 Such scholarship
and activism has worked to (1) argue for same-sex marriage in various
U.S. states as the self-evident outcome of a constitutional equality analy-
sis, and also worked to (2) limit the options of whichever uncooperative,
outlier states remain by requiring them to recognize same-sex marriages
entered into in other U.S. states—again using arguments pertaining to a
certain idea of equality.75 A pincer effect is the desired result, with
72. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 402.005 (West 2014) (emphasis added).
73. For a particularly notable and interesting exception, see generally Kerry Abrams,
Marriage Fraud, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (2012). Abrams’ piece is dedicated to exploring the
multiple federal and state doctrines and tests that have developed over time to determine whether a
particular marriage, or divorce, is a ‘real’ marriage or, instead, an attempt to defraud either one of
the marital partners or the state. As Abrams notes, both proponents and opponents of ‘marriage
equality’ problematically “assume that ‘marriage,’ even as its meaning has shifted over time, has a
stable meaning today.” Id. at 63.
74. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. R
75. In this respect, Brenda Cossman has observed how “scholars who argue in favor of the
interjurisdictional recognition of same-sex marriages are deploying the technical tools of their
trade to advance a pro-same-sex marriage politics, a liberal politics of recognition and equality.”
Cossman, supra note 5, at 162. Meanwhile, “[t]heir opponents—the scholars who argue against R
any interjurisdictional recognition of same-sex marriage—are, conversely, deploying their
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same-sex marriage rights across the United States the desired eventual
outcome.
This concluding section problematizes this liberal ‘marriage equal-
ity’ strategy, focusing on its interstate dimensions. Previous work of this
author has demonstrated dangers and shortcomings in any marriage
equality analysis as applied within a particular jurisdiction.76 Here, how-
ever, the focus is on problematizing the ways in which scholars and
activists want ‘marriage equality’ to work between and across (state)
jurisdictions. As is evident from the following discussion—and also lib-
eral scholars’ and activists’ extant legal strategies—the intra and inter-
state dimensions of marriage equality cannot be neatly separated from
each other. That being said, each of the three problematizations of mar-
riage equality sketched out here will have an explicit interstate relation-
ship-recognition analysis attached to it.
The first problematization stems from questions about how much
interstate ‘marriage’ recognition the idea of equality can accomplish,
especially in light of this essay’s observations about the intense plurality
of family law in the United States. For example, returning to the exam-
ple of Kentucky, it is likely the case that eliminating the requirement in
Kentucky’s statutory marriage definition that marital parties be opposite-
sex would result in the conducting of same-sex marriages in Kentucky.
Yet, it is not clear that that marriage would actually open up marriage
for Kentuckian same-sex marital partners outside of Kentucky. Indeed,
drilling down into what marriage actually means or implies in Kentucky,
it may be that a ‘Kentucky marriage’—whether same-sex or opposite-
sex—is best understood as a ‘civil union.’77 In other words, the inter-
state translation of this ‘Kentucky marriage’ using sameness-oriented
equality as a translation filter might result in a ‘civil union’—not a ‘mar-
technical tools in the service of a conservative politics of the traditional family. Both sides wear
their recognition or nonrecognition politics on their sleeves, notwithstanding the attempt to dress
them up in more technical clothes.” Id.
Hillel Levin’s work provides an important exception to the kind of scholarship that Cossman
describes. He strongly supports same-sex marriage rights in the United States but is
simultaneously hesitant about using conflicts analysis or anti-DOMA strategies to pursue these
rights. See Hillel Y. Levin, Conflicts and the Shifting Landscape Around Same-Sex Relationships,
41 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 93, 94 (2010). Levin is particularly worried about using a conflicts analysis
to achieve same-sex marriage rights because same-sex marriage advocates, like him, “have argued
that this is a matter internal to the states. Thus, to turn around and use conflicts as a wedge to
achieve recognition in other states would be disingenuous. . . . We have used conflicts as a shield;
to now use it as a sword would be a mistake.” Id. at 102.
76. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Redding, Dignity, Legal Pluralism, and Same-Sex Marriage, 75
BROOK. L. REV. 791 (2010).
77. See supra text accompanying note 72. R
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riage’—in a state like Illinois.78 Section 60 of the recently enacted Illi-
nois civil union statute reads as follows: “A marriage between persons
of the same sex, a civil union, or a substantially similar legal relation-
ship other than common law marriage, legally entered into in another
jurisdiction, shall be recognized in Illinois as a civil union.”79 As a
result, the use of equality arguments in this kind of interstate context
might have no marital consequences.
The second problematization is not one of no marital consequences,
but undesired marital consequences. These undesired consequences can
be of at least two sorts: ‘not enough marriage’ and ‘too much marriage.’
With respect to ‘not enough marriage’ and, for example, imagining that
same-sex marriage becomes available in Idaho,80 it is worth remember-
ing that Idaho’s definition of marriage characterizes marriage as a “per-
sonal relation arising out of a civil contract.”81 As a result of this
definition, a couple married in Idaho may find another state—using an
equality lens—merely recognizing their marriage as a dyadic contract
with few or none of the benefits that marriage supposedly brings via its
recognition by the state and other third parties. ‘Even worse,’ that state
may consider the Idaho marriage as creating simply a friend-like rela-
tionship with few legal implications attaching to that kind of inter-per-
sonal relation.82 With respect to ‘too much’ interstate recognition, here
the states that define marriage as involving some sort of covenant create
the conundrum. For example, partners marrying in a state like Ala-
bama—which describes marriage as being, at least in part, “a sacred
covenant, solemnized between a man and a woman”83—and then mov-
ing to a state like Arizona—i.e., a state not only possessing an undefined
‘marriage simpliciter’ but also a specifically legislated ‘covenant mar-
riage’—may find that equality gives them a kind of marriage in Arizona
that neither Alabama partner would have previously contemplated or
desired. Arizona’s special covenant marriage, for example, puts limits
on no-fault divorce.84
The third problematization of the use of equality in the interstate
78. Illinois civil unions are available for both same-sex and opposite-sex couples. See Illinois
Religious Freedom Protection and Civil Union Act, 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 75/10 (2014).
79. Id. at 75/60.
80. See generally Latta v. Otter, No. 13-CV-00482, slip op. at 9 (D. Idaho May 13, 2014)
(holding Idaho’s constitutional and statutory prohibitions against same-sex marriage
unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment), argued, Nos. 14-35420 & 14-35421 (9th Cir.
Sept. 8, 2014).
81. See supra text accompanying note 67. R
82. See generally Laura A. Rosenbury, Friends with Benefits?, 106 MICH. L. REV. 189, 191,
202 (2007) (describing and critiquing how current U.S. law dismissively treats friendship).
83. See supra text accompanying note 61. R
84. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-903 (2013).
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relationship-recognition domain relates to how the value of equality is
being misused by many in the ‘marriage equality’ movement more gen-
erally. As this author has argued elsewhere, the marriage equality move-
ment has too often sought equality without asking important questions
about whether equality comports with other important progressive val-
ues.85 The impulse has seemed to be ‘sameness first, questions later.’
With the interstate relationship-recognition debate, it appears that equal-
ity is again being used to advocate sameness, if also to imagine it out of
evident difference. Indeed, it is quite questionable whether Connecti-
cut’s ‘fusion marriage’86 is really the same thing as Idaho’s ‘civil-rela-
tional marriage’87 or, more generally, whether any two U.S. states
actually have mutually intelligible ‘marriage.’
To be sure, U.S. states do recognize each other’s marriages, but not
for reasons of equality precisely—a reality that marriage equality advo-
cates’ work often occludes. Indeed, more so than equality, it appears that
a very strong U.S. desire to encourage marriage-qua-marriage—a desire
matched in its strength by the strength of the United Kingdom’s desire
to discourage talaq/divorce—is what drives interstate recognition of
marriage in the United States. In line with this larger cultural impulse,
mainstream gay and lesbian advocates have also largely decided to val-
orize marriage—for all people everywhere—using arguments pertaining
to family stability, the welfare of children,88 and other traditional values
and priorities. This essay has suggested how this valorization of mar-
riage—now using a simplistic version of equality—gets repeated, how-
ever oddly, in the interstate domain.
In response to this use of an antiseptic equality in order to valorize
marriage, this essay has suggested, however, an important and over-
looked question, ‘What marriage?’ And in elaborating this question-
response, this essay has explored the ramifications of a difference-ori-
ented, pluralism-embracing lens on the contemporary interstate same-
sex relationship-recognition debate. While this pluralism lens might
85. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Redding, Querying Edith Windsor, Querying Equality, 59 VILL. L.
REV. TOLLE LEGE 9, 9 (2013).
86. See supra text accompanying note 68. R
87. See supra text accompanying note 67. R
88. For example, Joanna Grossman has argued, vis-à-vis DOMA, that “[t]he traditional, more
sensible [pre-DOMA] approach to [interstate] recognition . . . permit[ted] consideration of
competing interests like the expectations of the parties [and] the impact of non-recognition on the
couple’s children,” going on to later lament how a “Georgia appellate court . . . ruled . . . that a
woman was not ‘married’ to her civil union partner for purposes of measuring her compliance
with an order specifying that visitation with her children would not be allowed when she was
cohabitating with an adult to whom she was not legally married. The court’s ruling relied in part
on the fact that a civil union, under Vermont law, is not a ‘civil marriage.’” Grossman, supra note
14, at 436, 485. R
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MIA\69-1\MIA105.txt unknown Seq: 23  4-DEC-14 10:48
2014] MARRIAGE ≠ MARRIAGE 139
seem a highly implausible one for the United States, it is also the case
that an equality lens has, to this point, been an impossible achievement
for the United States. With ‘marriage equality’ as well, it remains to be
seen whether marriage, or robust equality, prevails.
